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Into the Wind: Rhett Butler and the Law of
War at Sea
JOHN PAUL JONES*
I
INTRODUCTION
When Margaret Mitchell wrote Gone With the Wind, her epic novel of the
American Civil War, she introduced to fiction the unforgettable character
Rhett Butler. What makes Butler unforgettable for readers is his unsettling
moral ambiguity, which Clark Gable brilliantly communicated from the
screen in the movie version of Mitchell's work. Her clever choice of Butler's
wartime calling aggravates the unease with which readers contemplate
Butler, for the author made him a blockade runner.
As hard as Butler is to figure out-a true scoundrel or simply a great
pretender?-so is it hard to morally or historically pigeonhole the blockade
running captains of the Confederacy. They certainly dared a great deal in
attempting to break in or out of the cordons patrolled by the U.S. Navy.1
While force of arms apparently took few lives, they could draw hostile fire
or face armed boarders with hostile intent. They ventured out in weather and
darkness that kept ordinary mariners otherwise snugly ashore. They regu-
larly risked impoverishment, imprisonment, or both. They operated a
makeshift and desperate pipeline between the Confederacy and her trading
partners, through which King Cotton flowed out and the tools for making
war flowed in. In this endeavor, they were absolutely vital to the rebellion,
as its leaders appreciated and made clear. On the other hand, they made for
themselves an enormously profitable market from the war and its depriva-
tions, catering to human weakness at the expense of the cause they
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.A., Marquette University; J.D., University of San
Diego; LL.M., Yale University. Co-Associate Editor, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
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'See generally F. Bradlee, Blockade Running During the Civil War (1974); D. Homer, The Blockade
Runners: True Tales of Running the Yankee Blockade of the Confederate Coast (1968); H. Cochran,
Blockade Runners of the Confederacy (1958).
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ostensibly aided. Indeed, Butler and the special merchant class he exempli-
fies both epitomize and indict the ideology we have come to embrace as
capitalism. Mitchell's theme in Gone With the Wind-of war between old
and new virtues-is personified in Rhett Butler, her blockade runner.
The sine qua non of a blockade runner is a blockade, and a blockade arises
out of international law. The term describes certain of the generally accepted
conditions under which neutral nations and their merchants may continue
trading with one or more nations at war.2 In the American Civil War, the two
sides chose to conform generally to the law of war, thereafter mimicking the
behavior of warring sovereigns. 3 In this, that part of the rest of the world
which was paying attention more or less acquiesced, adopting a stance of
neutrality. In this, the two American sides more or less acquiesced in turn.
From the assumption of these postures, there followed mutual attention.to
the laws of capture and neutrality, on land and at sea, and from that could
flow a blockade of Charleston, South Carolina, out of which Rhett Butler
would carve his reputation and make his fortune.
In what follows, I propose to review what Scarlett O'Hara reported in
Gone with the Wind about Rhett Butler's career as a blockade runner, and
then to make some guesses about what the law of war at sea might have
meant for Captain Butler's commercial operations. As a way of organizing
my thoughts about the interplay of three aspects of the law of war at
sea-capture or prize, blockade, and neutrality-I have chosen to speculate
about whether Butler would have sailed under a flag of convenience, i.e., the
Union Jack.
2See generally J. Verzijl et al., International Law in Historical Perspective, at pt. IX-C ("The Law
of Maritime Prize") (1992); C. Colombos, A Treatise on the Law of Prize (1926); T. Holland, A Manual
of Naval Prize Law (1888); F. Upton, The Law of Nations Affecting Commerce During War: With a
Review of the Jurisdiction, Practice and Proceedings of Prize Courts (1861).
In June 1861, Judge Betts of the U.S. District Court in New York, together with the two Prize
Commissioners of his court, Henry H. Elliott and E.H. Owen, anticipated a dramatic resurgence in prize
litigation as a result of the rebellion. The three wrote to Francis Upton requesting a summary of American
prize practice and proceedings. A member of the New York bar well known for his interest in prize law,
Upton supplied his treatise the following month, on his own initiative including a summary of the
relevant international law. Over half of the cases resulting from Union captures were subsequently
brought in Judge Betts' court, where Upton frequently appeared as counsel. See M. Robinton, An
Introduction to the Papers of the New York Prize Court 1861-1865, 30 and passim (1945). Robinton
attributes to Jugtice Joseph Story the note, "On the Practice in Prize Causes," which appears at 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 494 (1816).3For the story of the diplomatic exchanges arising from implementation of the blockade and the
aggressive, if often unsuccessful, efforts towards its enforcement by the U.S. Navy's two blockading
squadrons, see generally S. Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and
Diplomacy (1970), and I C. Savage, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War:
1776-1914, at ch. XI (1934).
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II
WHAT IS KNOWN OF RHETr BUTLER
Rhett Butler was born to a prominent low country family and was raised
in Charleston.4 He grew up on the water, early becoming expert in
navigating the inshore waters of both Carolinas. After Charleston was
blockaded in 1861, he acted as a pilot for blockade runners.
The Union Navy's practice was to treat blockade-running pilots with due
regard for the learned nature of their calling and the importance of their
services to the enemy.5 Others in the crew of a captured blockade runner
were apparently held no longer than was necessary for the prize court to
collect their statements for use in the condemnation of their vessel.
Charleston and Wilmington pilots whom the Union Navy caught red-handed
were retained in custody, however, more or less as prisoners of war.
Consequently, piloting blockade runners was regarded as risky business and
commensurately compensated.
Market conditions allowed a skilled and plucky pilot like Butler to quickly
amass capital sufficient for acquisition of his own vessel. Eventually, he
owned four blockade runners, operating out of both Charleston and
Wilmington, the only two Atlantic coast ports of the Confederacy at which
blockade running was feasible for most of the war. He is said to have
employed other pilots, no doubt so that his other vessels could be as
productive as the one he commanded, and that they might be steered by
those as expert in navigating the approaches to Wilmington as he was in
navigating the approaches to Charleston.
III
CAPTAIN BUTLER'S FLOTILLA
The four vessels in Rhett Butler's little fleet are never named or described
in any detail. His extraordinary success in avoiding the blockading force at
both ports persuades that his vessels were steam driven, able to outrun or
evade Union Navy pursuers driven by the wind. His success also suggests
that his vessels were nimble and of relatively shallow draft, enabling them
also to escape capture even by Union Navy steamers, for which general
4Facts about the fictional blockade runner Rhett Butler come from M. Mitchell, Gone With the Wind
(1936).5Bradlee, supra note 1, at 79; Cochran, supra note 1, at 37. According to Cochran, Admiral Dupont
recommended to Secretary Welles the imprisonment of the captain and supercargo of a blockade runner,
because the Navy "cannot exercise too much vigilance in preventing the return of these men, who from
their local knowledge of this part of the coast are the most efficient instruments of the rebels in violating
the blockade." Id.
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requirements of greater range and better seakeeping commonly dictated
larger hulls, broader beams, and deeper drafts.
Rather than offloading his outbound cargos of cotton at the nearest safe
port for transfer to neutral bottoms, Captain Butler preferred to carry them
all the way to England, in pursuit of the highest price. For this reason, I
suppose that at least the vessel he personally commanded was possessed of
sufficient range and seaworthiness for an Atlantic crossing. The vessel he
ran across the Atlantic might have been equipped as well with sails. Bunkers
for the amount of coal required to voyage so far under steam alone would
otherwise have dictated either a large and comparatively ungainly hull, or
else smaller and comparatively fewer spaces for cargo.
According to Scarlett O'Hara, Rhett Butler carried cotton to Nassau in the
Bahamas, to unnamed ports in Canada, and to ports in England, including
Liverpool. Out of Wilmington, his vessels certainly would have frequented
Bermuda. Outbound, Butler's vessels carried cotton on consignment for the
Confederacy. Returning, they transported medicines, arms, and other mili-
tary stores purchased for the government, as well as luxury items, including
women's wear, intimate and otherwise, purchased on Butler's own account.
He claimed to have sailed to New York at least once during the war, whence,
perhaps, he exported the hoop skirts and muskets he claimed, in a different
conversation, to have bought from a Union supplier. Some northern
merchants certainly traded knowingly with the enemy, and others certainly
traded with neutral partners, more or less aware that their goods were
destined after transshipment for import through the blockade.
Captain Butler bragged of realizing as much as 200% in profit on his
cargoes. At least sometimes, he took his own imports inland as far as Atlanta
for sale, rather than auctioning them on the pier, as was the general custom
of other blockade runners. He was never captured, and sold his vessels prior
to early 1864, when he turned his energies to food speculation. At the end
of the war, he quietly converted to his own use funds of the Confederate
government held offshore over which he had exercised control as an agent.
Together with the profits of his wartime enterprises, these left Rhett Butler
with a personal fortune amounting at one time to half a million dollars.
IV
A CONVENIENT FLAG FOR CAPTAIN BUTLER
There is nothing in the meager record from which to ascertain under what
flag Butler's vessels sailed during the conflict. A considerable amount of
re-flagging occurred early in the war, when U.S. shipowners based in the
South and sympathetic to secession transferred their vessels to owners in
England or her Atlantic possessions.6 Because Captain Butler preferred to
carry cotton not just to the nearest neutral port, but to distant (but more
profitable) markets in Canada and England, I think it likely that Butler
operated under a British flag at least the vessel of which he himself was the
master, and perhaps his entire flotilla.
From Scarlett O'Hara's report, Captain Butler lacked enthusiasm for
secession and the Confederate cause throughout the war. Nevertheless, he
was a citizen of South Carolina who regularly voiced his sympathy for the
rebels, admitted to acting as the Confederacy's contracting agent and
armorer, and operated his businesses under its protection. At least in the
legal sense, therefore, Rhett Butler's allegiance went to the secessionist
government. 7 He was accordingly an enemy of the Union and its Navy.
Under the law of war at sea, his vessels and their cargoes were forfeit upon
capture by the U.S. Navy and condemnation in a federal prize court. On the
other hand, neutral merchants and their vessels were entitled, despite a state
of war, to trade with both sides in conflict, so the ships of those with
allegiance to foreign sovereigns were not lawful objects of capture in our
civil war, unless they acted in some way contrary to the rules pertaining to
neutrality (e.g., by carrying contraband or defying a blockade). 8
Operating his vessels under a neutral flag offered Rhett Butler-the-
shipowner substantial advantages, especially if the flag belonged to a neutral
nation with clout, like England. A Union warship was obliged by the
realities of the international situation to tread more lightly in the presence of
the Union Jack than in the presence of the Palmetto flag of South Carolina.
The law is not always an ass, however, and the law was sufficiently
sophisticated as to draw a line dividing genuine sales from sham transactions
intended to circumvent the law of capture. A state of war entitled armed
ships of the belligerent powers to halt any merchant vessel for so long as
necessary to confirm the identity suggested by her flag and to ascertain both
the nature of her cargo and the status of any passengers. Herein, it is said,
is the traditional origin of "probable cause" modernly applied as a Consti-
tutional prerequisite to the analogous stopping of persons ashore by ordinary
police.9
Among the factors recognized as tending to call into doubt the transfer of
a ship's ownership are its timing with respect to the initiation of hostilities,
6Bemath, supra note 3, at 7.
7Colombos, supra note 2, at §§ 54-56; Holland, supra note 2, at §§ 19-31; Upton, supra note 2, at
260-62.
8Colombos, supra note 2, at §§ 199-202; Holland, supra note 2, at § 50; Upton, supra note 2, at
262-64.
9 Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 31,44 (1995). See Colombos, supra
note 2, at § 243.
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the adequacy of the exchanged consideration, and the degree to which the
allegedly former owner remains in control of her voyages and operations. 10
Evidence relevant to the question of ownership, as well as to other issues on
which forfeiture of the ship and its cargo could turn, was to be found in the
ship's papers and in the statements of her crew and passengers upon their
interrogation. 11
During the American Civil War, the flagrancy with which many English
shipping interests sided with the secessionists and flouted the laws of
neutrality itself became a factor for federal courts sitting to hear cases of
prize. Had any of Captain Butler's vessels been stopped, even when in
ballast, it is unlikely that any foreign flag or registration would have
sufficiently masked them when visited by a Union officer with a personal
financial interest in penetrating such disguise.' 2
From Captain Butler's extraordinary financial success it might reasonably
be inferred that his ships were rarely idle, and rarely sailed in ballast. What
transient advantage might accrue to his vessels from their re-flagging would
not survive their being caught with a cargo of contraband. A neutral vessel
was subject to capture and forfeiture for transporting contraband. Passengers
could be contraband if they were members of the military force or
government of the enemy, except those on diplomatic missions to neutral
states. Goods could be contraband according to their nature or when they
were to be delivered to the enemy government. Naturally, contraband goods
traditionally included military supplies and naval stores intended for the
enemy, as well as its despatches.
Others told Scarlett O'Hara that Captain Butler imported war materials.
On one occasion, he himself bragged to her of purchasing muskets. On
another, he told her he had been authorized to purchase guns in England with
funds of the secessionist government, and to bring them back to the
Confederacy. Had any of his vessels been found carrying munitions to the
Confederacy, the vessel would have been forfeit, regardless of its flag and
registry.
Captain Butler also imported hoop skirts, hoops, chantilly lace, silk, tea,
and sugar. Although very profitable, these were hardly contraband, so that
their presence aboard a neutral vessel did not itself justify capture and
forfeiture. A Confederate regulation, however, obliged shipowners to
'°Colombos, supra note 2, at § 51; Holland, supra note 2, at § 5; Upton, supra note 2, at 77-78.
t Robinton, supra note 2, at 47, 56-59; On the Practice in Prize Causes, supra note 2, at 495-99.
'
2When a vessel was condemned as prize, she was forfeit to the sovereign of her captors. As was the
custom in other sea powers, the officers and men of a U.S. warship were allowed by Act of Congress a
moiety of the net proceeds from the sale of their prize by the marshal. Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 606.
See Robinton, supra note 2, at 89-90. See also Holland, supra note 2, at 142-50.
Vol. 31, No. 4
reserve half the cargo space of inbound vessels for government cargoes.' 3
Regardless of their nature, goods consigned to the enemy government were
contraband, so, to the extent that Captain Butler complied with this law, his
vessels inbound were subject to forfeiture for carrying contraband, and their
flag or home port would have offered no defense.
Outbound, Captain Butler appears to have carried exclusively cotton. For
the Confederacy, cotton was more than a commodity. When inflation
quickly robbed government notes of their value, cotton became a medium of
exchange in the Confederacy, taken as revenue by the secessionist govern-
ment and distributed in payment of its public debts.' 4 When the Union
declared cotton contraband, the neutral powers by and large acquiesced.
Thus, the cargoes carried by Captain Butler's flotilla would have condemned
them to capture and forfeiture, despite their re-flagging, at least so long as
those cargoes were en route from, or to, a port of the Confederacy.
Regardless of her cargo or flag, any vessel attempting to run a blockade
was subject to capture and forfeiture as prize. 15 While international law
permitted neutrals during time of war to trade with the enemy goods that
were not contraband, it obliged neutrals to honor a blockade. Traditionally,
belligerent naval powers imposed blockades on particular ports of their
enemies. During the Civil War, the Union imposed a blockade on the entire
coastline of the Confederacy, from Hampton Roads in Virginia to the mouth
of the Rio Grande River in Texas. To this enlargement of the blockade
principle, the neutral powers also by and large acquiesced. In the Atlantic
theater of operations, the blockade quickly and effectively sealed the ports
of Virginia and Savannah, but it long remained permeable to the specialized
traffic of blockade runners in and out of both Wilmington and Charleston.
Once the blockade was established, however, re-flagging no longer offered
any advantage for those vessels venturing in or out of Wilmington or
Charleston. All vessels caught running the blockade were subject to capture
and forfeiture, neutral vessels included.
Bermuda is only 690 miles from Wilmington; Nassau is only 560 miles
from Charleston. The proximity of these neutral ports was a considerable
advantage for the secessionists, their trading partners, and the blockade
runners serving both. Because Captain Butler preferred to carry contraband
to its final destination, re-flagging might have offered a somewhat greater
attraction to him than to other blockade runners content to make only the
short voyages between Wilmington or Charleston and the nearest British
island possession. In theory, cargo could only be contraband when carried to
13Cochran, supra note 1, at 50.
l4 Bernath, supra note 3, at 2-3; Bradlee, supra note 1, at 7-8; Cochran, supra note 1, at 49.
15Colombos, supra note 2, at § 203; Holland, supra note 2, at § 138; Upton, supra note 2, at 189-202.
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or from the port of an enemy.' 6 Cotton shipped from Wilmington to
Bermuda, or from Charleston to Nassau, was therefore contraband, but
cotton shipped from Bermuda or Nassau to other neutral ports was not.
In an attempt to break out of a blockade, a British flag would have offered
no protection from capture, and once free of the blockade, transiting from an
enemy port to a neutral one, a British flag would have offered no greater
safeguard for a vessel carrying contraband. For the next leg, the longer haul
to Canada or England, however, a British flag might have gained the vessel
and her cargo at least an initial presumption of immunity from capture. That
flag might have the same effect for the long first leg of a return voyage, but
inbound cargo of the forbidden sort would become contraband once it left
Bermuda or Nassau for a Confederate port, and the vessel transporting it
would be subject to capture until she arrived safely under Confederate guns.
A British flag would be no more effective when it came time to break into
the blockaded port.
Even on the high seas between neutral ports, a British flag might not have
reduced very much the risk of capture. The Union's blockading squadrons
went about their work aggressively, with a deaf ear turned to the complaints
of neutral powers, especially England. Patently sympathetic to the seces-
sionists and their movement for independence, England was viewed by
Union naval leaders and others in the Federal government as abusing its
neutral status for the benefit of their enemies. Had one of Captain Butler's
vessels been re-flagged and then captured on a voyage between Nassau and
Liverpool, he might well have seen her condemned by a Union prize court
applying the "continuous voyage doctrine." 17
V
CONCLUSION
In the long run, then, a Union Jack would not have saved any of Captain
Butler's vessels from forfeiture. They really still belonged to the enemy,
they carried contraband, and they ran the blockade. But first, the U.S. Navy
16Colombos, supra note 2, at §§ 162-71; Holland, supra note 2, at §§ 57-73; Upton, supra note 2, at
213-20.
17Colombos, supra note 2, at §§ 164-66; Holland, supra note 2, at §§ 71; Bernath, supra note 3, at
63-98.
Under the continuous voyage doctrine, the contraband nature of goods is not altered by their
transhipment through a neutral port along the way. This doctrine, of distinct advantage to the greater sea
power as between belligerents, emerged from the English prize court during the Napoleonic wars. Union
prize courts would have applied it to captures from the Nassau trade with relish at the prospect of the
British lion being hoisted by her own petard. Indeed, to the frustration of English commerce, her
majesty's government declined to object in such cases, preferring the advantage the doctrine promised
the Royal Navy in future wars at sea.
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had to capture one, and Butler was surely enough of an opportunist to see
that, away from the coastal blockade, an English flag would complicate the
game for his hunters, at least marginally. Someday, a moment's hesitation in
changing course or calling for more steam on the part of a pursuer could
have put his quarry out of range when she entered neutral waters, or when
darkness otherwise put an end to the chase. That would likely have been
enough of an edge to persuade Rhett Butler to change his stripes.

